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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the presence of window dressing in the Brazilian investment fund market, focusing on equity funds. 
Window dressing is a practice that presents a particular portfolio composition to the market, which is different from that 
held by the fund in the reporting period. Just before the end of the period, fund managers change their positions with the 
aim of presenting safer, more profitable securities portfolios. We believe that there is a lack of empirical evidence on this 
topic in Brazil. Previous research focuses on diversification, style analysis, fund portfolio turnover, manager profile, and 
performance. Therefore, we believe that our paper is pioneering in presenting results on window dressing in Brazil. With 
the presence of window dressing, the market may signal distorted results to investors and guide their allocations towards 
funds in which they would not invest in the absence of such practices. Moreover, the adoption of window dressing may 
increase transaction costs and thus destroy value. Our results present a connection with previous studies by Bremer and 
Kato (1996), O’Neal (2001), Ng and Wang (2004), Ortiz, Sarto, and Vicente (2012), and Agarwal, Gay, and Ling (2014). This 
paper provides evidence of window dressing in Brazilian equity funds and proposes an empirical study to verify the presence 
of the practice between 2010 and 2016, using market model residuals, rank gap, and backward holding return gap analysis 
techniques. In short, our results are consistent with window dressing practices in funds managed by small companies that 
were losers against the Bovespa Index and presented a high tracking error in the period.
Keywords: window dressing, stock investment funds, portfolio disclosure, Brazilian market, CVM classification.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper aims to reveal engagement in window 
dressing in the Brazilian investment funds market. This 
practice consists of investment fund managers intervening 
in order to change a fund’s investment positions just before 
the portfolio is disclosed. By engaging in window dressing, 
investment fund managers present a securities portfolio 
composition that does not reflect the reality of the fund in 
that period. Thus, during the reporting period, managers 
change their positions in poorly performing equities to 
better performing ones. The change in portfolio positions 
aims to present a different portfolio to investors, and this 
alteration is not driven by the fund’s investment strategy.
Holding high quality securities in a portfolio 
(even when the portfolio did not present consistent 
overall performance in the period) should not induce 
investors to allocate funds. However, there is evidence 
in previous studies indicating that investor decisions in 
such conditions can be misled. Investors may interpret 
information incorrectly and take decisions under the 
influence of noise (Black, 1986). In Brazil, for example, 
Chague, De-Losso, and Giovannetti (2018) showed that 
a fall attributed to the stock price (caused by the payment 
of dividends) is enough for individual investors to buy 
a security. That is, individuals appear to disregard the 
information associated with the price of an asset. The 
studies by Carrillo and Palfrey (2011) and Eyster, Rabin, 
and Vayanos (2017) corroborate this behavior.
According to Musto (1997), disclosure of the final 
composition of a portfolio plays an important role in 
investor decisions. In general, investors are susceptible to 
holding investments in investment funds that present high 
performance securities in their portfolios, even when the 
fund shows poor prior performance (Morey and O’Neal, 
2006). This result is a partial reflection of the connection 
investors make between the portfolio reported to the 
market and the manager’s ability to choose securities 
(Grinblatt & Titman, 1989, 1993; Wermers, 2000). It 
is therefore expected that, in order to raise more funds 
for their investment funds, managers practice window 
dressing.
The research on investment funds in Brazil presents 
results involving fundraising (Sanvicente, 2002), the 
role of managers (Leusin & Brito, 2008), style analysis 
(Yoshinaga, Castro, Oda & Lucchesi, 2009), fund 
portfolio rotation (Milan & Eid, 2015), diversification 
(Moraes & Serra, 2017), and performance (Matos & 
Castro, 2013; Trindade & Malaquias, 2015; Oreng, Eid 
& Yoshinaga, 2017). However, we believe that there is 
a lack of empirical results on the theme proposed for 
this research in Brazil.
Thus, this paper contributes to the literature by 
presenting empirical evidence of window dressing 
practices in the Brazilian market. In addition, the research 
is warranted by the growth in the fund industry in Brazil 
in the 21st century, which has reached new levels in terms 
of the funds’ consolidated net equity. Between 2000 and 
2017, the fund industry grew by 350%, from approximately 
R$ 1 trillion to R$ 4.5 trillion (Brazilian Association of 
Financial and Capital Market Entities – Anbima, 2018). 
As the Brazilian capital market matures and develops, the 
contribution of this topic, in the practical and theoretical 
field, tends to gain even more relevance.
Clarifying the evidence of window dressing practices 
in the Brazilian context enables the inappropriate 
interpretations that investors may have regarding an 
investment fund to be highlighted, as well as the abilities 
of its managers. When the investor’s inflow or outflow 
decision derives from the returns reported by funds 
(originating from the quotas) and/or from the securities 
that funds report in their portfolios, this decision 
may have been misled by window dressing. With the 
results presented here and, more importantly, with the 
methodologies proposed, identifying the patterns for 
window dressing becomes more tangible and provides 
more confidence for future investment decisions.
We assess the presence of window dressing practices 
in Brazil by considering the empirical strategies of O’Neal 
(2001) and Agarwal et al. (2014). The results presented 
indicate that funds managed by small companies 
(henceforth called “small manager”) present greater 
evidence of window dressing practices than those 
managed by large institutions (henceforth called large 
manager). In addition, we show that funds that lost against 
the Bovespa Index (Ibovespa) and that presented a high 
tracking error in the analysis period are also associated 
with window dressing practices.
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
One set of international studies indicates the presence 
of window dressing practices. Haugen and Lakonishok 
(1988) found evidence in the U.S. market that window 
dressing is the main factor explaining the high returns of 
low performance stocks just after the end of the fiscal year. 
Just before the close of the fiscal year and the final date 
considered for reporting the portfolio, low performance 
stocks were sold and possibly bought after the turn of 
the year. This movement corroborates the January effect, 
whose academic approach was introduced by Watchel 
(1942). 
Musto (1997) also showed evidence that window 
dressing has an influence over abnormal returns at the 
turn of the fiscal year. The study examined security trading 
patterns in the U.S. money market in periods close to the 
turn of the fiscal year, when portfolio compositions in this 
market are disclosed, and it found evidence consistent 
with window dressing practices in managers’ strategies. 
The results showed that securities maturing on the day 
after the close of the fiscal year presented a higher return 
(compared with those maturing on the last day of the 
fiscal year). This premium is even greater for assets with a 
higher risk of default. The author attributed this premium 
to the “disutility” that managers face at the end of the 
fiscal year when disclosing riskier securities to investors. 
For the U.S. private debt securities market, Maxwell 
(1998) indicated the factors causing the January effect. 
The findings showed an abnormal increase in the demand 
for securities with the best rates at the end of the fiscal 
year, which corroborated the movement expected in a 
window dressing strategy. In contrast, Lee, Porter, and 
Weaver (1998) used fund data from the U.S. market 
covering 1976 to 1993 with the aim of testing the January 
effect hypotheses that distinguished window dressing 
from performance hedging. The authors concluded that 
the most probable source of the excess return of small 
companies found in the January effect is performance 
hedging, and not window dressing. 
In addition, Lakonishok, Shleifer, Thaler, and Vishny 
(1991) studied the presence of window dressing practices 
in 769 U.S. pension fund managers from 1985 to 1989. 
The authors presented weak evidence that the managers 
sold more loser stocks close to disclosure at the end of 
the calendar year, as well as not finding evidence of an 
increase in the demand for winner stocks in the period. 
These conclusions were, therefore, divergent from the 
movements expected for window dressing practices. 
However, given the characteristics of pension funds, which 
are held by institutions, which in turn are expected to have 
more resources and technical abilities than individual 
investors, these institutions are expected to be less likely 
to be deceived by window dressing.
Musto (1999) argued that funds whose clientele are 
individual investors are more likely to practice window 
dressing. This result corroborated the findings of 
Lakonishok et al. (1991) regarding pension funds. This 
is possibly due to the fact that access to the information 
and weekly databases of money market funds is too costly 
for individual investors. Thus, in reporting periods, such 
funds would hold government bond portfolios instead 
of private securities, as they are less risky. The findings 
support the presence of window dressing, since the 
managers actually reallocate funds into safer assets during 
reporting periods. According to O’Neal (2001), by sharing 
this logic funds that present high performance in the 
period reported also have reasons to practice window 
dressing. The high performance may somehow have been 
underpinned by securities that investors would not expect 
to invest in (riskier securities, for example).
Various authors have studied window dressing 
practices in the U.S. mutual funds market. Meier and 
Schaumburg (2004) sought to detect an abnormal trading 
pattern during the last days of the quarter, especially for 
funds that had just performed poorly. The results showed 
a significant interaction between the trades carried out 
by managers and portfolio disclosure dates. In addition, 
Edward O’Neal (2001) studied the years from 1995 to 
2000 and presented evidence of this practice in the period. 
Using two different methodologies, daily returns and 
portfolio composition, Morey and O’Neal (2006) analyzed 
the period from 1998 to 2001 and found strong evidence 
of window dressing in mutual funds in the U.S. market. 
For high quality mutual funds, the authors suggested an 
abnormal movement from private securities towards safer 
National Treasury bonds.
Ng and Wang (2004) revealed that, on average, the 
U.S. funds analyzed sold their small caps with the worst 
returns in the last quarter of the fiscal year, reflecting 
manager behavior associated with window dressing 
practices. Bremer and Kato (1996) examined the presence 
of window dressing practices in the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 
The authors found strong evidence that winner stocks 
are traded more than loser ones in the reporting month, 
suggesting the presence of window dressing practices 
aiming to buy winner stocks and disclose them in the 
portfolio. 
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Ortiz et al. (2012) studied 865 debt investment funds 
in the period from June of 1999 to December of 2006 in 
the Spanish market. The analysis period provided a sample 
of 35,171 monthly portfolios grouped by the authors 
into (i) short-term funds, whose portfolios presented a 
duration measure of up to two years and (ii) long-term 
funds, whose portfolios presented a duration measure 
of more than two years. The authors found evidence 
that debt investment fund managers hold less weight 
in government bonds on disclosure dates. In short, the 
authors concluded that the investment strategies adopted 
by the fund managers analyzed are apparently based on 
the portfolio disclosure calendar. 
Empirically studying window dressing practices is 
difficult due to the lack of precise information on the 
portfolios held by funds between disclosure periods 
(O’Neal, 2001). However, if portfolio composition 
information was available, for example, on a day-to-day 
basis, window dressing practices would not exist, since 
investors could not be “deceived” by this strategy.
For the U.S. mutual funds universe, O’Neal (2001) 
estimated that the costs attributed to window dressing may 
exceed US$ 1 billion per year. The presence of window 
dressing practices causes an excessive increase in costs 
for investment funds. The costs may be implicit, when 
investors are manipulated regarding the real nature of 
the portfolio of their investments, and explicit, in the 
form of transaction costs, given the increased volume of 
transactions just before disclosure (O’Neal, 2001).
In light of the studies presented, a similar analysis 
is important for the Brazilian capital market. Investor 
decisions between investing, holding, or withdrawing 
resources from a fund may be misled by window 
dressing practices, which can lead investors to error. 
Provided that trades in securities are not inconsistent 
with investment fund policy, nor go against the rules 
presented to investors in any way, window dressing 
practices cannot be considered illegal. However, the 
discussions in the ethical and moral arena are more 
extensive and do not form part of the scope of this 
paper.
With the increased participation of the capital market 
in Brazilian society, specifically with the evolution of the 
investment fund industry, window dressing practices 
may play an important role in investor decision making. 
To show the evolution of the investment fund industry 
in the Brazilian market in the 21st century, the graphical 
representation in Figure 1 is presented.
Figure 1 Evolution of the net equity value of the fund industry in Brazil (in billion BRL)
Source: Elaborated by the authors based on data from the Brazilian Association of Financial and Capital Market Entities (Anbima, 
2018).
In the 2000s, the fund industry in the Brazilian 
market presented a net equity of approximately R$ 
1 trillion. In 2017, this position surpassed the R$ 
4.5 trillion mark. Notably, there has been increased 
participation of investment funds in the Brazilian 
economic environment and window dressing practices, 
if implemented, have a maximized potential to penalize 
market participants.
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3. DATABASE AND METHODOLOGY
The sample used for this study is composed of equity 
investment funds (according to the CVM classification) 
that have an average net equity between 1/1/2010 and 
12/31/2016 of more than or equal to R$ 1 million. We 
adopted this size criterion with the aim of ensuring the 
funds analyzed were professionally managed, as well as 
greater availability of data. According to Huang, Sialm, 
and Zhang (2011), larger funds have fewer problems of 
absent and incoherent information.
Quota Investment Funds (FICs) were excluded, since 
funds invested in through FICs, when the criteria are met, 
already make up the sample of this study.
The funds included in the sample also need to be 
actively managed. Investment funds with passive 
management, by definition, seek to achieve returns close 
to their reference index. There are therefore no reasons for 
the managers of these funds to seek returns that deviate 
from the reference index. Actively managed funds, in 
contrast, seek to beat some reference index and will try 
to hold (or only disclose) in their portfolios securities 
that they believe to have this potential. 
Given the definitions mentioned in the sample, the 
Quantum | AXIS database presented 375 funds. Quantum 
| AXIS is a digital platform that makes it possible to access, 
analyze, buy, and monitor financial information in a 
comprehensive database involving funds, stocks, derivatives, 
managers, registration details, and historical time series 
data, among others. With 84 months of information, the 
database presents 31,500 portfolios disclosed to the market.
No other criterion was used to select these 375 funds, 
including their qualitative characteristics regarding aims or 
investment policy. Although incentive fees, when used in 
the form of manager remuneration, may have impacted the 
funds’ ability to choose securities (Elton, Gruber & Blacke, 
2003), this information was also not considered for this study.
To remove possible distortions from the database 
caused by outliers, 1 percentile of the sample (315 
portfolios) was eliminated, these being the 157 portfolios 
with the highest calculated return and the 158 portfolios 
with the lowest calculated return. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the 
portfolios, considering the separation by net equity.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of the chosen sample (in million BRL)
Net equity interval
Number of 
funds
Total number of 
portfolios
Number of 
portfolios without 
outliers
Mean net equity 
of the fund
Standard deviation 
of the net equity of 
the fund
Median net 
equity of the fund
5,000 < x 4 336 327 15,222 13,007 10,705
1,000 < x ≤ 5,000 12 1,008 1,000 1,760 755 1,489
500 < x ≤ 1,000 21 1,764 1,725 673 135 616
100 < x ≤ 500 83 6,972 6,896 227 112 193
50 < x ≤ 100 72 6,048 6,011 71 15 69
10 < x ≤ 50 125 10,500 10,407 25 11 22
1 ≤ x ≤ 10 58 4,872 4,819 5 3 4
Total 375 31,500 31,185
Note: Selected sample distributed based on its average net equity between 1/1/2010 and 12/31/2016 and quantification of 
the number of portfolios for each category. The sample used in this paper excludes the outlier portfolios and, therefore, contains 
31,185 analyzed portfolios.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
To achieve the objective proposed by this paper, three 
methodologies were used and are presented below.
3.1 Residuals Analysis
The residuals analysis consists of using the ordinary 
least squares (OLS) method to regress the return reported 
by the investment funds (represented by the profitability 
of the securities) with the return calculated based on 
their portfolio asset composition. The residuals analysis 
was elaborated based on the market model residuals 
model used by O’Neal (2001). The smaller the residuals 
generated by this relationship, the greater the explanatory 
power of the dependent variable in terms of the fund’s 
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reported return. From a different perspective, the greater 
the residuals generated by the relationship presented in the 
OLS, the stronger the evidence that, on average, the funds 
that compose the sample practice window dressing. By 
regressing the funds’ reported returns with the calculated 
returns, we have, in equation 1:
in which REPi,t is the return reported by fund i in period 
t, αi is the constant term, CALCi,t is the calculated return 
for fund i in period t, and e is the error term.
According to Chen Hong, Huang, and Kubik (2004), 
Yan (2008), and Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2012), the 
size of the fund is an important variable and can have an 
influence on performance. In addition, Brown, Harlow 
and Starks (1996), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and 
Tufano (1998), Cremers and Petajisto (2009), and Huang 
et al. (2011) showed that loser funds have incentives 
to increase the risk of their portfolios in comparison 
with winner funds and, even considering the greater 
risk, they tend to present a lower return. Finally, the 
studies cited also presented the tracking error of the fund’s 
portfolio as an important variable due to the managers’ 
behavior in light of past successes and failures against the 
benchmark. Therefore, we separated the sample for this 
study by following the characteristics mentioned. Thus:
 y The size of the managing institution: according to the 
net equity information for the managing institutions in 
the fund industry on 12/31/2016, the median net equity 
was R$ 1.103 billion. Managers with a net equity above 
the median were considered “large”. Managers with a 
net equity below the median were considered “small”.
 y Winners and losers: over the 84 months analyzed, each 
one of the portfolios was compared to the Ibovespa 
return in its respective month. The funds that managed 
to equal or beat the Ibovespa in most of the months 
were categorized as “winners”. The funds that did not 
achieve this target were considered “losers”.
 y Tracking error: the median tracking error of the sample 
was 11.67% during the 84 months studied. The funds 
that presented a tracking error greater than or equal to 
the median were categorized as “high TE”. The funds 
that presented a tracking error lower than the median 
were classified as “low TE”.
The categories presented enable different approaches 
in the methodologies proposed. This allows for more 
conclusive results regarding the evidence of window 
dressing practices. The Results and Data Analysis section 
presents the results for each one of the categories and 
their combinations, when applicable.
3.2 Rank Gap
As window dressing is an unobservable practice, it is 
necessary to develop proxies that can detect it. Agarwal et 
al. (2014) presented two methods for measuring window 
dressing. The first, called rank gap, consists of elaborating 
three different ranks and capturing the difference between 
them. As presented in Table 2, the ranks are: (i) a rank 
elaborated with the investment fund return information 
[rank of the fund’s return (RFR)]; (ii) a rank elaborated 
with the proportion of winner stocks in each one of 
the funds [rank of the proportion of winners (RPW)]; 
and (iii) a rank elaborated with the proportion of loser 
stocks in each one of the funds [rank of the proportion 
of losers (RPL)]. On average, winner investment funds 
are expected to have a portfolio combination with high 
proportions of winner stocks and low proportions of 
loser stocks. And similarly, on average, loser investment 
funds have low proportions of winner stocks and high 
proportions of loser stocks. The difference between ranks 
(rank gap) is elaborated for each one of the 84 months 
analyzed, seeking consistency of the results during the 
whole period. For the first rank, the RFR, the investment 
funds were ordered in decreasing order according to the 
return on their securities. Thus, by separating the rank 
into percentiles, the fund with the highest return will be 
represented in the 1st percentile. In contrast, the fund with 
the lowest return will be represented in the 100th percentile.
The other two ranks, the RPW and RPL, were composed 
in two stages: (i) for each one of the 84 months of the 
sample, a rank was composed with the stocks traded on 
the Brasil, Bolsa, Balcão (B3) exchange and ordered in 
decreasing order according to their returns for the month. 
This rank of stocks was separated into quintiles, in order to 
identify which stocks were winners (1st quintile) and which 
were losers (5th quintile). The use of this attribution for the 
highest 20% and lowest 20% was based on Jegadeesh and 
Titman (1993); (ii) considering each monthly portfolio, 
we captured the percentage share in winner stocks and 
the percentage share in loser stocks for each one of the 
funds. Using the percentage share in winner stocks, the 
funds were ordered in decreasing order, thus making up 
the RPW. Using the percentage share in loser stocks, the 
funds were ordered in increasing order, thus making up 
the RPL. 
The numbering present in the ranks represents each 
percentile into which the sample will be organized. 
Therefore, it is expected that the portfolio(s) present 
in the first percentile of the fund return rank will also 
be present in the first percentile of the other two ranks. 
There is a basis for this prerogative, since portfolios that 
reported high performance in the reporting period tend 
1, , ,i t i i t i tREP a CALC e= + +
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to have a greater proportion in winner stocks and a lower 
proportion in loser stocks. Therefore, funds that presented 
a low return in the period, but that presented a high 
proportion of winner stocks in the same period, have 
greater indications of practicing window dressing. Table 
2 presents the illustration of the ranks. 
Table 2
Illustration of the ranks proposed by the rank gap methodology
Fund’s return rank Proportion of winners rank Proportion of losers rank
1 Best return 1 Highest proportion 1 Lowest proportion
2 2 2
3 3 3
. . .
. . .
. . .
100 Worst return 100 Lowest proportion 100 Highest proportion
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
With the separation of the ranks into percentiles, it is 
possible to measure the difference between ranks (rank 
gap) using the function in equation 2:
in which RFR is the fund’s return rank, RPW is the 
proportion of winners rank, and RPL is the proportion 
of losers rank.
For example, a fund with a higher disclosed return 
will be represented in the 1st percentile of the RFR. 
Identifying the presence of winner securities in the fund’s 
portfolio in, for example, 99% of its composition, this 
will be represented in the 1st RPW percentile (since the 
rank is ordered in decreasing order). Naturally, 1% of the 
remaining securities are loser securities. Thus, this fund 
will be represented in the 1st RPL percentile (since the rank 
is ordered in increasing order). Based on the example, 
the rank gap result will be equal to 0 and, therefore, there 
will be no evidence of window dressing practices for that 
fund. As an opposite example, for results of this rank gap 
equation that are higher or lower than 0, the greater the 
distance from this target, the stronger the evidence of 
window dressing will be.
3.3 Backward Holding Return Gap (BHRG)
The second model elaborated by Agarwal et al. (2014) 
was called backward holding return gap. This method 
aims to compare the return on the fund’s real portfolio 
and the fund’s hypothetical return if it held the stocks of 
the disclosed portfolio over the whole period reported. 
This method, involving the return on the securities, 
which represents the return on the real portfolio, does 
not consider transaction costs or any fees paid to the 
fund’s manager/administrator, since the hypothetical 
return also does not have this impact. For each one of the 
31,185 portfolios present in the sample (total of 31,500 
portfolios minus the 315 outlier portfolios), the return was 
recalculated based on its assets and respective weights in 
the portfolio. Therefore, 62,370 information points were 
considered. For each reported return (31,185) there is a 
corresponding hypothetical portfolio return (31,185). The 
comparison between the two portfolio groups was made 
using the Student t test and non-parametric tests, such 
as the Wilcoxon rank-sum test, to ensure the robustness 
of the results.
In general, it is worth highlighting that the methods 
presented here aim to find evidence of window dressing 
practices. The lack of daily public information makes 
it impossible to verify these practices empirically. 
Therefore, there are limitations for this type of study. 
The buying of winner stocks and selling of loser stocks 
close to the reporting dates may also be associated with 
momentum trading, a strategy adopted by managers with 
the expectation that winner stocks in the present tend 
to be equally winning in the future. This interpretation 
is also valid for loser stocks. Giovannetti, Cavalcante, 
Chague, and Bueno (2016) documented risk factors in the 
Brazilian market and found that the momentum trading 
risk factor is significant in this capital market.
2 
2
RPW RPLRank gap RFR + = −   
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4. RESULTS AND DATA ANALYSIS
4.1 Residuals Analysis 
The analysis tests confirm the prediction that the 
independent variable CALC (calculated return) has 
explanatory power in REP (reported return) at a 1% 
level of significance (p-value = 0.0000). Applying the 
model for the different categorizations that the study 
proposes (manager size, fund’s return against the 
Ibovespa, and tracking error), the p-value presented was 
the same, demonstrating the consistency of the results. 
However, the different categories and their combinations 
presented different R² results. This reveals that funds with 
certain characteristics explain reported returns not only 
through calculated returns, but through other unknown 
independent variables. The lower the model’s R², therefore, 
the greater the evidence of window dressing practices. This 
is explained by the fact that window dressing practices 
in the model is one of the unknown variables. All else 
remaining constant, the lower the model’s R², the greater 
the residual and more significant the window dressing 
variable for explaining reported return, indicated as REP 
in this study.
The results show that the funds whose managing 
companies are classified as small (net equity lower than 
R$ 1.103 billion) present a residual (1-R²) of 0.401311. 
This result is significantly different from the 1% of the 
residual (1-R²) presented by the funds with a manager 
interpreted as being large. Therefore, all else remaining 
constant, the deviation of the residuals from one category 
in relation to the other is due, at least in part, to the 
variation in the significance of the window dressing 
variable in the model. Funds with a manager classified 
as large present a model in which the window dressing 
variable presents less significance than the model of funds 
with a manager classified as small. Besides the statistical 
findings and seeking explanations for these results, it is 
possible to infer that the greater flexibility that smaller 
funds have in their investment strategies could be the 
possible trigger for window dressing practices. In addition, 
the studies by Chen et al. (2004), Yan (2008), and Elton 
et al. (2012) reveal that there is a relationship between 
the size of the fund and its performance, a result that 
is directly associated with window dressing practices. 
Table 3 presents the main results.
Table 3 
Main results of the residuals analysis
Portfolios (n) Adjusted R² Residual (1-R²)
Total
Large manager 23,701 0.709883 0.290117*
Small manager 7,484 0.598689 0.401311*
Total 31,185 0.683318 0.316682
Small manager
And winner 5,763 0.678467 0.321533
And loser 1,721 0.504548 0.495452
Total 7,484
Small manager, loser
And high tracking error 1,134 0.449245 0.550755*
And low tracking error 587 0.812705 0.187295*
Total 1,721
* = differences in the means of the residuals significant at 1%. 
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
With the finding that funds with a small manager have 
greater evidence of window dressing practices, we sought 
to understand whether these funds, when facing an adverse 
result in relation to the Ibovespa, present even more (or 
less) evidence for window dressing practices. In the small 
manager category (7,484 portfolios), there are differences 
between the residual (1-R²) of the winner and loser funds. 
Even though there is no statistical difference between the 
residuals (1-R²) calculated for these two subcategories, 
these results derive from the previous model, separating the 
funds with a small manager and losers between funds that 
present a high tracking error and low tracking error. Using 
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the tracking error as one of the subcategories of the sample 
is important due to the behavior of the managers in relation 
to past successes and failures against the benchmark. The 
funds subcategorized as high tracking error consistently 
have this characteristic over the 84 months analyzed. 
The residual (1-R²) of the funds with a small manager, 
losers, and with a high tracking error was 0.550755 and 
presented a significant statistical difference at 1% in relation 
to the funds with a small manager, losers, and with a low 
tracking error. In short, the residuals analysis demonstrates 
that funds with a small manager and funds with a small 
manager, losers, and a high tracking error produce a 
higher level of residuals, which is statistically significant 
in relation to their comparative peers (funds with a large 
manager and funds with a small manager, losers, and a low 
tracking error, respectively). For O’Neal (2001), artificial 
rebalancing of a portfolio (window dressing) suggests 
greater residuals produced by the model (market model 
residuals). This is a reflection of the lower explanatory 
power of the dependent variable (calculated returns) in 
relation to the independent variable (reported returns), as 
detailed in section 3.1. Therefore, it is feasible to conclude 
that the funds with a small manager and the funds with 
a small manager, losers, and a high tracking error, due 
to the distance of their produced residuals in relation to 
their comparative peers, are more susceptible to window 
dressing practices. These results can also be explained by 
the fact that loser funds have incentives to increase the 
risk of their portfolios in comparison with winner funds 
and, even considering the greater risk, tend to present a 
lower return (Brown et al., 1996; Chevalier & Ellison, 1997; 
Cremers & Petajisto, 2009; Huang et al., 2011).
4.2 Rank Gap
The rank gap methodology has the particularity of not 
using, unlike the other two methodologies of this study, 
any information on returns calculated by the authors. This 
mitigates the risk of presenting spurious results derived 
from returns calculated by means of manual intervention 
and provides greater robustness to the study. The rank gap 
proposal is to reveal window dressing practices with the 
information on returns reported by the funds combined 
with the returns information of the different stocks 
available in the market that the funds can acquire. Table 
4 presents the results of the rank gap for the 375 funds of 
the sample separated into the categories already presented.
The mean difference between ranks is presented in 
percentile units and, thus, the greater the deviation from 
the target (mean rank gap = 0), the greater the evidence 
of window dressing practices. This statistical relationship 
was initially proposed by Agarwal et al. (2014). Funds 
with a large manager have, on average, 0.99 percentile 
of a difference between their positions in the RFR and 
the mean between their positions in the RPW and in the 
RPL. The funds with a small manager presented an even 
greater mean difference, of 1.14 percentile. Funds with 
a small manager presented a greater deviation from the 
target and, therefore, are statistically more susceptible to 
window dressing practices, thus corroborating the findings 
of the previous methodology, the residuals analysis. The 
results found for the rank gap are consistent with Agarwal 
et al. (2014). The authors reveal that a fund’s performance 
and the ability of its managers are more related with 
window dressing than with asset selection. Due to the 
absence of information regarding the managers’ abilities, 
subsample analyses were carried out. The results found 
reveal that there is a difference in terms of the size of the 
funds. Small managers are more associated with window 
dressing practices when compared with large managers.
Table 4 
Results of the rank gap
Mean rank gap
(absolute values)
Total 0.48
Large manager 0.99
Small manager 1.14
Small manager, winner 1.89
Small manager, loser 1.31
Small manager, loser, and high 
tracking error
1.61
Small manager, loser, and low 
tracking error
0.83
Note: Funds with a net equity above the median of the sample 
for 12/31/2016 (R$ 1.103 billion) were considered to be large 
managers, and funds with net equity below this median were 
considered to be small managers; funds that equaled or beat 
the Bovespa Index (Ibovespa) return in most of the 84 months 
analyzed were considered winning managers, while funds 
below this level were considered losing managers; funds that 
surpassed the median of 11.67% presented during the period 
studied were classified as high tracking error, and funds that 
did not surpass the median of the period were classified as low 
tracking error.
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
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Funds with a small manager, subdivided between 
winners and losers against the Ibovespa, present 
divergent conclusions in relation to the residuals 
analysis technique. The mean rank gap of the funds with 
a small manager and winners shows a greater deviation 
from the target (1.89 percentile). It is concluded that 
funds with a small manager and winners are more 
susceptible to window dressing than funds with a small 
manager and losers. Although it may be an apparently 
conflicting result with the one found using the residuals 
analysis methodology, we should highlight that these 
methods present different approaches. According to 
Agarwal et al. (2014), the rank gap method is a relative 
measure, and the others are considered to be absolute 
measures. In the residuals analysis method, for example, 
the calculation is carried out based on the difference 
between the expected return (market model residuals) 
and actual return.
Finally, the funds with a small manager, losers, and 
presenting a high tracking error in the period had a more 
accentuated deviation from the target than funds with a 
low tracking error. For these subcategories, the results 
converge with the findings in the residuals analysis.
As already discussed in the Residuals Analysis 
subsection, we believe that the greater flexibility attributed 
to the funds with a small manager regarding movements 
of their securities may be an indicator that favors window 
dressing practices. For the funds with a small manager, 
losers, and presenting a high tracking error, the results 
also favor window dressing practices. The distance from 
the target (rank gap = 0) was approximately double the 
result presented by low tracking error funds.
5. BACKWARD HOLDING RETURN GAP (BHRG)
The 31,185 portfolios reported by the investment 
funds that make up the sample (31,500 total portfolios 
minus 315 portfolios considered outliers) had their 
returns recalculated based on the reported portfolio 
(hypothetical portfolio). These returns, in turn, had their 
means compared to the reported mean returns of each 
fund in each one of the months. The methodology uses 
the premise that the portfolio reported by the fund at the 
end of each month should represent, at least substantially, 
the portfolio held during the course of the month (and 
which was responsible for the return reported by the 
fund). When calculating the return on the hypothetical 
portfolio and comparing it with the fund’s reported return, 
seeking a minimum deviation, the premise is necessary. 
Table 5 presents the main results for the BHRG.
The Student t test was used to test the difference 
between the means of the returns reported (quotas) by 
the funds and the calculated returns of the hypothetical 
portfolio. The categories that presented statistically equal 
means for both returns were: (i) funds with a small 
manager, winners; and (ii) funds with a small manager, 
losers, and a low tracking error.
This result shows that the funds with these 
characteristics do not present evidence of window dressing 
practices, since the return on the reported portfolio 
(hypothetical portfolio) matches the reported return 
(quotas). In contrast, the other subcategories used in the 
study – (i) funds with a large manager, (ii) funds with a 
small manager, (iii) funds with a small manager, losers, 
and (iv) funds with a small manager, losers, with a high 
tracking error – presented statistically different means at a 
1% level of significance. Based on this methodology, these 
funds intuitively present evidence of window dressing. 
This intuition is based on the decision of the portfolio 
manager who, when observing winner and loser securities 
in the reporting period, leans towards winner securities 
to give the false impression of a greater selection ability 
(Agarwal et al. 2014).
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Table 5
Main results of the backward holding return gap
Mean returns
Hypothetical portfolio Reported (quotas) Student t (t-statistic)
Total 0.00460 0.00317 3.03758*
Large manager 0.00458 0.00327 2.39664**
Small manager 0.00467 0.00284 1.95215**
Small manager, winner 0.00499 0.00477 0.23496
Small manager, loser 0.00359 -0.00364 2.79339*
Small manager, loser, and high 
tracking error
0.00538 -0.00457 2.80958*
Small manager, loser, and low 
tracking error
0.00012 -0.00183 0.59876
Note: Funds with a net equity above the median of the sample for 12/31/2016 (R$ 1.103 billion) were considered to be large 
managers, and funds with a net equity below this median were considered to be small managers; funds that equaled or beat the 
Bovespa Index (Ibovespa) return in most of the 84 months analyzed were considered winning managers, while funds below this 
level were considered losing managers; funds that surpassed the median of 11.67% presented during the period studied were 
classified as high tracking error, and funds that did not surpass the median of the period were classified as low tracking error.
* = mean returns different at a 1% level of significance; ** = mean returns different at a 10% level of significance. 
Source: Elaborated by the authors.
The results of this research corroborate the findings 
of Bremer and Kato (1996), O’Neal (2001), Ng and Wang 
(2004), and Ortiz et al. (2012) for the Brazilian market. 
In addition, the separation presented for size, history of 
returns, and tracking error was shown to be relevant for 
Brazil, according to the studies by Brown et al. (1996), 
Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998), 
Cremers and Petajisto (2009), and Huang et al. (2011) 
for other markets.
It is important to highlight that the fundamental 
premise for this methodology is limited. Considering 
that the reported portfolio will represent the portfolio held 
during the whole month reported (at least substantially) 
may be a little optimistic. However, the tests show results 
that are quite coherent with the other methodologies 
presented, which provides confidence for adopting the 
premise.
6. CONCLUSION
The general conclusions of this research indicate the 
presence of window dressing practices, especially for 
funds classified as small, losers, and with a high tracking 
error. The results presented by the three methodologies 
tested consistently indicate that funds managed by small 
companies present greater evidence of window dressing 
practices than funds managed by large institutions (large 
manager).
This result may be linked to the greater flexibility that 
funds managed by smaller companies have regarding 
their investment strategies. The funds categorized as 
small manager and that were losers against the Ibovespa 
during most of the 84 months analyzed presented, in the 
residuals analysis and in the BHRG, greater evidence of 
window dressing practices than those funds with a small 
manager and that were winners in relation to the Ibovespa.
Funds classified as small manager before the adverse 
results in the reporting period tend to alter their portfolio 
positions to present different securities to the market 
from those causing the adverse results. Finally, the funds 
with a small manager, losers, and that presented a high 
tracking error in most of the 84 months consistently 
showed greater evidence of window dressing practices 
in the three methodologies. This is the result of greater 
portfolio movements, including just before reporting, and 
the greater assumption of risk by the managers given the 
greater distance from the benchmark. As window dressing 
cannot be clearly identified empirically, this paper seeks 
to provide evidence that this practice also occurs in the 
Brazilian capital market in stock investment funds.
In summary, the methodologies are approximations 
that are made possible by the level of details that the 
funds provide in the Brazilian market. As approximations 
are concerned, the methodologies have limitations. As 
the fund industry in the Brazilian market has a greater 
volume of net equity for fixed income and multimarket 
funds, these funds could serve as a suggestion for future 
window dressing studies.
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